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Basic Research and the Analysis
of Current Business Conditions
Solomon Fabricant
Now and then one of the friends of the National Bureau urges us to
spend some of our energy on the analysis of current business conditions.
This interest in the state of the economy is understandable, especially
at a time like the present. The direction in which the economy is moving
currently is a matter of serious concern to all persons charged with the
management of affairs, large or small. Any clue we could provide to the
course of events during the weeks and months ahead of us would be of
immediate practical value.
Yet the National Bureau holds fast to the program of basic research
mapped out at its inception. We continue to devote ourselves largely
to broad, persistent economic questions. Our objectistoascertain
important economic facts, to uncover fundamental principles of economic
behavior—facts and principles that will be of use in dealing with every
major problem of policy. And such results cannot be secured easily.
By their very nature, the studies we undertake cannot promise quick
guidance to those who must make their decisions today.
It goes without saying that we would like to be of immediate help
to those around us. We are irked no less than others by the slow pace of
our work. At least as keenly as they, we are aware of the "general"
character of our results and the frequency with which we label them
"tentative." It is not indifference to the importance of current economic
analysis that leads us to resist the pressures to take a hand in it. Nor is it
because we wish to keep above the heat and dust of the life about us, for
the pressures come also from within ourselves.
We concentrate on basic economic research because we believe that
in this way we can make the best contribution of which we are capable
to the analysis of current business conditions—not immediately, to be sure,
but in the long run.
In support of this belief there is the lesson of experience. The basic
work we have done in the past is being widely used by others in their
day-by-day analysis of business conditions. The value these applications
NOTE: Excerpt reprinted from Thirty-sixth Annual Report of the National Bureau of
Economic Research (May 1956), pp. 1—10.
I am greatly indebted to my colleagues for helpful suggestions in the preparation of
this report.
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now yield and may continue to yield in the future could not have been
realized had we diverted our attention in the past to the immediate
questions of those days.
There is a second reason. The ability of men to judge the present state
of the economy and trace its tendencies into the future is far from satis-
factory. This, perhaps, is why we are asked to join in that difficult task.
But the implication we draw is not that of prompt acceptance of the
request. There is painfully much still to be learned about the basic
features of our economy. We have a staff experienced in such work and
devoted to it. Whatever we can do today to expand tested economic
knowledge is an investment that, with all its risks, is likely to pay larger
social dividends than any current analysis that might engage our
energies.
Let me illustrate our experience with an example or two of the uses
being made of our work in current business analysis. ...Duringthe
winter of 1937—38 it became clear that the climb out of the depths of the
great depression had come to a halt and that the interruption was more
than a minor setback. The shrinkage in business activity that had been
taking place during the summer and fall had reached serious proportions.
There was considerable anxiety as to how far the contraction would go
and what signs might indicate its end.
It was then that a public agency requested the National Bureau to
prepare a memorandum on statistical indicators of cyclical revivals.
The request was urgent, the time short. Little of significance could be
expected from information quickly thrown together and analyzed by
impromptu methods. It was necessary to have some capital to exploit.
When its initial work on national income had been completed [in
the early twenties], the National Bureau had turned a major part of its
energies to another piece of basic research—business cycles. This subject,
too, was "one of great importance to all classes in the community," as
our annual report mentioned at the time. It was a subject, also, in which
quantitative methods could be used to advantage. No one else was
planning a comprehensive survey of the whole subject. The staff "seemed"
qualified by experience and interest to fill the want. And much of the
knowledge gained in studying fluctuations in the national income would be
usable here.
By 1937 the National Bureau had a large collection of statistical
materials at hand. These had been subjected to considerable analysis
and the staff had thought deeply about their meaning. This investment
could be mobilized to yield something useful about indicators of cyclical
revivals even in the brief time available. The Bureau took on the
assignment.
Almost five hundred American monthly or quarterly series in our
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possession—series on production, employment, prices, security issues,
orders, and the like—were examined by Mitchell, Burns, and their
co-workers, and for each the timing of its changes in relation to business
revivals was determined. From this list were selected the series that had
been tolerably consistent in their timing and were of "sufficiently general
interest to warrant some attention by students of current economic
conditions." These, numbering seventy-one, were listed in an elaborate
table showing the average lead or lag for each series; and to help its
users, Mitchell and Burns added information on the variability of
timing—for "tolerable" hardly meant "perfect" consistency—and on
such other characteristics of each series as might be needed in judging
the significance of its changes.
They did not stop there. From the list of seventy-one series, a further
selection was made of the most trustworthy indicators. Attention was given
to the length of average lead, uniformity of lead, frequency and intensity
of erratic movements, length of the record, and other criteria. None of
the series could meet all the criteria well; Mitchell and Burns selected
twenty-one that fared best, on the whole. And to their lists of indicators,
Mitchell and Burns added a carefully prepared list of "cautions" for the
guidance of those who must chart our position in the business cycle at
any specific time. These were at least as valuable a part of their memor-
andum as the selection of series indicating cyclical revival.
We have become so familiar during the past eighteen years with the
statistics and characteristic cyclical behavior of many economic processes,
that it is difficult to remember the impact of this memorandum—published
as a Bulletin in May 1938 [and reprinted here, Chapter 6]—on economists
and business analysts at the time. Here for the first time was an analysis
of a large body of statistics that was at once penetrating and compre-
hensive, that sought uniformities of behavior but did not ignore variability,
that revealed sharp awareness of the day-to-day problems of business
analysis as well as a deep understanding of the complexities inherent in
the scientific analysis of business cycles. The paper must have seemed
a revelation to its readers.
Since publication of the memorandum the National Bureau has
extended the analysis of cyclical indicators in various directions. Before
I report the sequel, let me underscore the large amount of unhurried
work that built the basis for the memorandum.
First, techniques of measuring business cycles had to be devised in
the light of hypotheses concerning their nature, study and comparison
of existing statistical methods, review of available statistical data, and
experience with the methods tentatively selected. The chapters in
Mitchell's 1927 volume constituted a major step in this task; the two
reports that Mitchell wrote at different stages of his progress in applying
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the techniques—reports he called "experimental" and decided not to
publish—another step; the 1935 Bulletin by Mitchell and Burns on the
National Bureau's measures of cyclical behavior, a third. Still other
stages preparatory to the analysis of cyclical indicators, and following it,
are hidden in the large volume on Measuring Business Cycles that Burns
and Mitchell published in 1946.
Second, a vast quantity of statistical data had to be gathered, if the
various economic processes involved in business cycles were to be properly
studied. This meant more than copying ready-made series out of standard
sources. Frequently it meant piecing together series from the individual
issues of business periodicals, which in turn required a search through
possible sources; and sometimes it meant also the elaborate calculations
and careful judgment that Macaulay and then Durand put into the
preparation of their widely used series on bond yields. In addition, it was
necessary to determine, so far as possible, the precise nature of the process
reported by each series and the reliability of the information provided—
which might mean seeking explanations for differences between one source
and another, or one series and another. All this work had to be checked.
Nor did this essential step end when the figures were neatly arrayed.
Charting each series and putting it through the analysis frequently raised
further questions as to its meaning and reliability, and these had to be
cleared up.
Third, a set of reference dates had to be determined—dates with which
the timing of individual series could be compared. Thorp's study of
business annals was part of this task; determination of the month around
which the cyclical upturns in the various series clustered was another.
The few pages on dating business cycles in Measuring Business Cycles
do not indicate the magnitude of the task.
Fourth, each series to be analyzed had to be examined for seasonal
fluctuations; and when these were found—as was usually the case—
they had to be removed to permit cyclical changes to stand out clearly.
This was a large task, not only because of the amount of arithmetic
that goes into determining and removing a seasonal change, but also
because more than one method sometimes had to be tried. The easy
device, frequently favored by businessmen and journalists, of comparing
the current month with the corresponding month of last year could not
be used because it is inefficient and can be misleading. Matters may be
worsening even when current levels exceed those of last year. They may
be worsening also when the excess this month is greater than that of the
previous month—because of a changing seasonal, or because an inter-
ruption to expansion which proved to be minor a year ago may not prove
so again. Recently we have been experimenting with electronic calculators
for the purpose of determining seasonal fluctuations, and we hope to
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extend these experiments in the coming year—an interest that indicates
how burdensome the removal of seasonals is at present.
Finally, almost an equal amount of labor went into determining, for
each of the five hundred series, its average lead or lag, the variation about
the average, and the other characteristics of cyclical behavior mentioned
earlier.
Spelling out these steps can only suggest how the information at the
disposal of Mitchell and Burns in 1937 had been accumulated. It may
also serve, however, to indicate what is generally involved in the applica-
tion of quantitative methods to economic analysis and why scholars work-
ing by themselves are under a serious handicap in dealing effectively
with many economic questions.
Shortly after the war we decided to turn back to the question of
statistical indicators. It had not been neglected in the interim, for Mitchell
and other members of the staff were working steadily on the determination
and explanation of the characteristic cyclical behavior of various economic
processes; but the Employment Act of 1946 had been passed and another
close look at the sequence of changes that take place at turning points in
business promised a useful guide to those who would have to bear the
responsibilities imposed by the Act.
Moore, who was in charge of the task, not only extended the analysis
through the business cycle of 1933—38, but also took advantage of the
fact that the Bureau had added many series to its collection—by that
time eight hundred in number—and had improved the measures of
cyclical behavior. He revised the indicators of revivals, paying more
attention to coinciding and lagging series (following up suggestions in
the Mitchell-Burns paper) as a valuable confirmation of the indications
of the leaders; applied the analysis also to recessions; and experimented
with other techniques of analysis. The results appeared in his Occas-
ional Paper, published in 1950, which has attained a degree of popu-
larity unusual for National Bureau publications.[Reprintedhere,
Chapter 7.J
The list of indicators of cyclical revivals (and recessions) that he
presented differed from the earlier selection for a number of reasons,
two of which are of interest here. One was the appearance of series not
available before—gross national product, personal income, and consumer
instalment debt, among others. Another was the guidance he obtained
from cyclical analyses carried on at the National Bureau after 1938—
Mitchell's, of course, and Abramovitz on inventories, Barger's on corporate
profits and personal income, Burns' on construction, Evans' on incorpora-
tions, Haberler's on consumer instalment credit, and Hultgren's on
transportation. Moore's list reflected less the mechanical sifting of time
series that Mitchell and Burns had been compelled to rely on to some
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degree, and more the reasoned choice that study of the chain of events
during business cycles makes possible.
With the passage of time, generalizations derived from the experience
of one period can be checked against later experience. Moore was able
to test the twenty-one indicators selected by Mitchell and Burns against
their timing in 1938;and later he took advantage of the postwar
experience to test his own list, since it was derived from information
available only through 1938. Despite the substantial secular and structural
changes that we know have occurred in the economy, and the fact
that every business cycle is influenced by special factors that distinguish
it from its fellows, the tests were encouraging. They showed a family
resemblance between the later cycles and those of earlier years. In this
respect, there has been no obvious alteration in the nature of business
cycles.
The comparison may be illustrated with the behavior of the indicators
during the revival centered at August 1954. Among the series that presage
turns in general business are the financial processes, investment com-
mitments, and other sensitive factors that generally initiate and respond
to the very beginnings of revival or recession and contribute to its spread—
processes represented among the indicators by liabilities of business
failures, industrial common stock prices, residential building contracts,
new orders for durable goods, contracts for commercial and industrial
building, new incorporations, hours worked, and sensitive prices of
basic commodities. At the beginning of 1954 half of these eight series
were rising, and in May—three months before the trough in business—
all were going up. Generally coinciding or nearly coinciding with
business cycle turns are, as one would expect, turns in such broad
measures of business activity as employment and unemployment, gross
national product, industrial production, bank debits outside New York
City, freight carloadings, corporate profits, and wholesale prices (excluding
farm products and processed foods). During 1953—54 these behaved as
in earlier cycles, on the whole. Through the fall, winter, and spring of
1953—54, all or most of these indicators were falling, except between one
pair of months in the spring. By July half were falling, half rising. In
October all were rising. As for the group that usually lags turns in general
business conditions (personal income and retail sales, consumer instalment
debt and manufacturers' inventories, and bank rates on business loans),
four out of five were falling as late as August of 1954. Not until October
were more than half of them rising.'
1Computationsare based on directions of change in centered moving averages applied
to each seasonally adjusted indicator. The period of the average depends on the extent of
erratic changes: it is six months at the maximum (e.g. for liabilities of failures). For a few
series the directions of change are on a month-to-month basis.
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In a word, then, the three groups of indicators behaved during the
revival of 1954 as they had been found to behave during earlier revivals.
This is especially interesting because the recession from 1953 to 1954
had been exceptionally mild—far milder than the "average" cycle of
prewar experience. Of course, there had been occasional mild recessions
in the prewar period also. During such recessions a number of the
indicators—especially the lagging series—showed no obvious response
to the decline in business. The 1953—54 recession resembled these earlier
episodes in that respect: personal income and instalment debt did not
decline appreciably after 1953.
Moore has developed further the diffusion indexes first used in
Measuring Business Cycles. These measure the proportion of series moving
up or down and thus provide a simple picture of their consensus. Together
with the diffusion indexes provided by Hultgren in his paper on profits
and by Burns in his "New Facts on Business Cycles" [reprinted here,
Chapters 11 and 2], they reveal in a striking manner that cycles in
dfferent activities, or even in different firms engaged in the same activity,
do not follow the same temporal course. During an expansion the maxi-
mum identity of movement—hardly ever 100 per cent—is reached some
time before the peak in aggregate activity appears. Months before
aggregate activity reaches its peak the proportion of expanding industries
or firms is already declining. Months before the aggregate reaches its
trough the proportion of expanding activities isalready rising. The
diffusion indexes thus constitute another leading group of indicators. They
have even more interest in indicating how cross currents grow in import-
ance during the complicated series of events we call recession and revival.
More recently, the indicators and diffusion indexes have been put
on a current basis—that is,the turns are being calculated not from
observations of the whole cycle, including developments after the turns
themselves, but only from observation of developments up to the month
under consideration. Once one moves from hindsight to contemporary
observation, cyclical turns become far more difficult to identify. Changes
that soon reverse themselves and therefore represent only temporary
interruptions tocyclical expansion or contraction appear to occur
frequently. This too has considerable scientific interest, as Ruth Mack's
book on the shoe-leather-hide industries demonstrates. Any explanation
of how business cycles are generated must take account of the incessant
change that surrounds businessmen and the effects this must have on
their outlook and behavior.
How helpful the indicators of cyclical recession and revival will be
to those who wish to detect the drift of business conditions remains to be
seen. The "current-basis" indicators should aid in the experiment. It
is safe to say that anyone who uses them to the exclusion of other
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information and ignores the reservations with which Mitchell and Burns
first surrounded them is bound to be disappointed.
It is well to repeat some of these cautions, just as Moore did, for the
indicators cannot provide the simple key to the future that folk seek.
Mitchell and Burns mentioned the difficulty of distinguishing an
erratic fluctuation from a cyclical turn in a particular process. It is
prominent in the charts of the current-basis indicators already mentioned.
There is danger, therefore, in trusting the indications of single series.
It is necessary to search out the consensus of groups of series, not confining
attention to the twenty-one indicators alone. And this is important also
because the cyclical timing of a particular series may vary from time to
time—sometimes irregularly, sometimes secularly or structurally. There
is need, consequently, to be alert to the latter and aware of the former.
The occasional appearance of "incipient revivals which suffer a
relapse" poses another problem not to be ignored. An example appeared
during the deep depression of the thirties, when the revival that seemed
under way at the middle of 1932 petered out in the fall with a serious
falling-off of business to another low in the spring of 1933. Such a reversal
in direction might be encountered at other stages of expansion and
contraction also, as our experience in 1951—52 illustrates. In her study
of the shoe-leather-hide industries, Ruth Mack gave special attention to
the phenomenon as it appeared in those branches of business. She is
exploring the matter further in the study of short cycles.
Mitchell and Burns emphasized, in this connection, the need to
consider "important factors arising outside the realm of business."
This has become increasingly important in recent decades, with the
growth of government and such developments as the Employment Act
of 1946 and the cold war.
In man's persistent search for a clue to the future, sequence analysis
has long attracted attention. If today we have a better understanding of
its possibilities and its limitations, it is because of the basic research that
has been done on business cycles. The businessman who must speculate
about the future course of economic conditions knows more keenly than
before that he must "eschew simple formulas" and study a wide range of
data. His watch for the typical sequence of events must be kept in full
awareness of the variation that characterizes successive business cycles
and the changes that go on within them. He must be alert to structural
and secular "changes in the making," yet resist the tendency to generalize
too easily on the basis of recent experience. He must recognize that several
possibilities lie before him and that probabilities have to be attached to
each of them; and he must stand ready to revise the probabilities, and
the judgments and policies he bases on them, as evidence accumulates
from month to month. He must be sensitive to the opportunities open to
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his own firm, as well as to the general factors that affect business as a
whole.
Moore has followed his Occasional Paper with other short pieces
dealing with aspects of the subject, one or two of which I have already
mentioned. Others of our staff have dealt or are dealing with related
questions. I can mention only Hastay's work on businessmen's expecta-
tions—which may turn out to be more useful for telling us something
about business behavior than for adding to our kit of forecasting tools.
We plan to assemble the various contributions into a volume [the present
one] that will include also some of the statistical materials we have used,
thus making available to the public part of the rich collection of time
series that we have accumulated and analyzed over the years. The volume
should prove valuable to the many business economists and students of
business cycles who are aware of the need to improve the knowledge and
techniques which current analysis must use, as well as of the need to use
what knowledge and techniques we now have as wisely as possible.
Before leaving this question, I would like to recall a general conclusion
of Mitchell and Burns about the way to improve forecasting. It points
to the kind of work on which we must concentrate the energies we devote
to the subject of business cycles. Mechanical methods of trying to im-
prove prognoses, made on a strictly empirical basis, seemed to them to
be less promising than efforts to learn about the interrelations among the
cyclical movements of different economic processes. Our recent work on
statistical indicators gives every support to this conclusion.
At any moment, analysts of business conditions must perforce apply
what knowledge they have of the connections between current changes
and the events that precede and follow, uncertain though it may be.
A major task of our business cycle studies is to strengthen this knowledge
of the connections among events—to forge links where they are now
lacking, and to replace weak links with stronger ones, and so to help
business analysts judge the significance of the events that unroll before
their eyes.
If I had the time I could illustrate this process of construction and
reconstruction with our studies of one of the elements of what is popularly
referred to as the "cost-price squeeze." I would start with the account
Mitchell gave in 1913 of how prosperity breeds depression and recall his
hypothesis that "the very conditions that make business profitable
gradually evolve conditions that threaten a reduction in profits"; that
among these conditions were rising prime costs per unit of product, and
counting heavily in prime costs—though more in some industries than
in others—were unit labor costs; and that unit labor costs could be
expected to rise, especially in the later stages of business expansion, first
as a result of the characteristic cyclical behavior of wage rates, and second
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because of the probable cyclical behavior of the quantity of labor used
per unit of product. I would then go on to show how Mitchell's con-
jectures guided our work when we began the study of business cycles;
what questions were raised about labor costs when Hultgren came to
grips with the matter, in so far as it could be analyzed in the records of
American railroads; how Mitchell revised his hypothesis in the light of
this work and also of the Bureau's studies of labor productivity, Creamer's
analysis of cyclical fluctuations in wage rates, and his own preliminary
analysis of the figures for manufacturing; what Moore found when he
carried the analysis of the manufacturing data a step forward; how the
results obtained for the interwar period compare with the recent behavior
of wage cost per unit; and what Hultgren is doing to advance the analysis
in his current studies of costs in individual industries. Let me merely
mention that our studies do show that in manufacturing as a whole, at
least, labor cost per unit typically turns upward in the final stages of
business expansion. While Mitchell's original hypothesis about unit
labor cost requires alteration in certain significant details, its main point
is consistent with the facts for certain important industries as we have
been able to observe them.
* * *
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